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Abstract 
 
We examine the determinants and capital market consequences of linguistic complexity in 
conference calls held in English by non-U.S. firms. We find that linguistic complexity is 
positively associated with the language barrier in the firms’ home country. Also, linguistic 
complexity in firms’ conference calls affects the extent to which the capital market reacts to the 
information releases. Firms with more linguistic complexity in their conference calls show less 
trading volume and price movement following the information releases, after controlling for the 
actual earnings news. Further, the capital market’s response to linguistic complexity is more 
pronounced when there is greater implicit (as captured by the presence of foreign investors) or 
explicit (as captured by how actively analysts ask questions) demand for the English conference 
calls. This suggests that the form in which financial information is presented can impose 
additional processing costs by limiting investors’ ability to interpret the reported financials. 
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1.  Introduction 
Against the backdrop of increased globalization in capital markets, it has become more 
important for firms to communicate effectively in a way that appeals to a global investor base. 
While the worldwide adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) indicates a 
trajectory towards cross-country harmonization of mandatory financial disclosure, little is known 
about firms’ voluntary disclosure practices across jurisdictions. Yet, prior studies show that the 
quality of foreign firm financial reporting does not always measure up to global standards (Lang 
et al. 2003) and the reporting quality of firms continues to differ across countries.
1 Consequently, 
a better understanding of supplemental disclosure quality is warranted. 
Most cross-country studies that consider the disclosure quality of foreign firms focus 
largely on quantitative information. For example, studies examine how the properties of reported 
earnings differ across countries and find that investor protection and rule enforcement in the 
home country can explain the variation in the quality of reported earnings (Leuz et al. 2008). 
This paper extends that line of inquiry with an important distinction. We focus on the form in 
which the information is presented – the linguistic complexity of the information disclosure. 
Using transcripts of conference calls from non-U.S. companies, we examine the causes of 
linguistic complexity in foreign firm disclosures and how that complexity affects the capital 
market response to the reported financials. Because all conference calls in our sample are held in 
English, we are able to measure linguistic complexity holding constant the language in which the 
information is disclosed.
2 
                                                        
1 We use the terms “foreign” and “non-U.S.” interchangeably. 
2 This is analogous to the cross-listing literature where researchers are able to examine the reporting behavior of 
foreign firms while holding constant the underlying rules and regulation (Lang et al. 2006).  2 
 
Recently, researchers began to explore the capital market implications of complexity in 
the disclosure of firms in the U.S. (Li 2010). Studies show how complexity in the text of a firm’s 
filings can affect capital markets’ reactions to the disclosed information. Greater complexity 
affects the properties of analysts’ forecasts (Lehavy et al. 2011) and investor trading volume 
(Miller 2010; Loughran and McDonalds 2010). One simple explanation for the observed capital 
market reaction is that complexity directly affects the calls’ information content of the calls by 
increasing the processing costs for investors. For example, complexity, by limiting investors’ 
ability to interpret the implications of the reported financials, may reduce the precision of the 
information signal and lead to lower demand. 
Disclosure by foreign firms will impose similar processing costs. Yet, there may be 
greater variation in the linguistic complexity for foreign firms due to language barriers.   
Managers may face a greater hurdle in their interactions with foreign interlocutors, especially for 
firms domiciled in countries where English is not commonly spoken.
3 It is also possible that 
linguistic complexity leads to capital market consequences by conveying additional information 
about the firm that investors find useful for valuation purposes (Lei 2010; Rennekamp 2012). For 
example, the fluency of a manager may provide meaningful signals of the firm’s level of 
commitment to reach out to a global investor base. We therefore predict that linguistic 
complexity in foreign firms’ disclosures will decrease the extent to which investors react to the 
information releases. 
We choose conference calls as the setting of our inquiries for two reasons. First, financial 
reporting and disclosure are the centerpieces of firms’ outreach efforts to investors. A large 
                                                        
3 Firms are indeed aware of such barriers and use translators during conference calls. However, the portion of firms 
using translators are less than 1% in our sample, which suggests that the additional processing cost from using a 
translator exceeds the benefits. 3 
 
number of firms use conference calls to explain both financial and non-financial information. Yet 
little is known about this voluntary disclosure practice outside the U.S. While many studies have 
looked at the properties of conference calls in the U.S. (e.g., Bushee et al. 2004; Hollander et al. 
2010) and at the information content of those calls (e.g., Matsumoto et al. 2011), there is little 
research on this disclosure medium outside of the U.S. (Bassemir et al. 2012 is an exception).  
Second, the Q&A section of the conference calls provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the effect of linguistic complexity and the resulting capital market consequences. The 
statements made by managers in the Q&A section of the conference calls are more spontaneous 
and thus less likely to be influenced by a staged preparation (Li 2010). Whereas other prepared 
disclosures (e.g., press releases and regulatory filings) can be scrutinized and carefully proofread 
ahead of their public release, conference calls are more likely to be revealing of the differences 
in corporate managers’ levels of proficiency during the Q&A session. 
Our sample consists of 11,740 conference call transcripts from non-U.S. firms between 
2002 and 2010 available from Thomson StreetEvents. We measure linguistic complexity using 
the Gunning Fog (hereafter, Fog) and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (hereafter, Kincaid) Indexes.  
Both measures are based on the number of words per sentence and the number of syllables per 
word and were introduced in large sample studies of financial reporting complexity by Li (2008). 
According to the Fog and Kincaid Indexes, transcripts with more words per sentence and more 
syllables per word are more difficult to understand and therefore present information with greater 
complexity. 
We first examine the determinants of linguistic complexity in the Q&A section of the 
conference calls of non-U.S. firms. We find that at the country level, linguistic complexity is 
positively associated with the language barrier in the companies’ home-country. Firms from 4 
 
countries linguistically more distant from English (e.g., China or Thailand) exhibit a higher 
degree of complexity in their interactions with analysts. Also, we find that the linguistic 
complexity of foreign firms exhibits a significantly negative association with firms’ home 
country English Proficiency Index (EPI)
4, consistent with firms’ ability to communicate in plain 
English being a function of their domestic roots in terms of English proficiency. This is despite 
the fact that our sample often includes large global corporations that choose to communicate 
directly with investors through conference calls and that supposedly have a strong command of 
English. 
This is not to say that country-level determinants are the only drivers of linguistic 
complexity in the disclosures of foreign firms. As a matter of fact, the variation of linguistic 
complexity within countries is higher than the variation across countries.
5 Therefore, we also 
examine various determinants of linguistic complexity at the firm- and conference call- levels. 
We find that smaller firms show a higher level of linguistic complexity while those with more 
prior experience with English conference calls show lower level of complexity. Conference calls 
with more information, measured using the number of words, and those that use a translator 
show greater complexity. In our cross-sectional tests, we explore both firm- and conference call-
level variation to better identify the conditions under which linguistic complexity leads to 
differential capital market consequences. 
Next, we test our main hypothesis that linguistic complexity in foreign firms’ disclosure 
will affect the disclosure’s information content, i.e., the extent to which the capital market reacts 
to information releases. Conference calls reveal not only a significant amount of financial 
                                                        
4 EPI is an index computed by EF Education First, based on data collected from free online English tests, using 
about 2 million observations across 44 countries. 
5 The average standard deviation of the Fog score within each country is 1.48 (untabulated) and the standard 
deviation of the average linguistic complexity across countries is 0.75 (Table 2). 5 
 
information, but also provide firms with an opportunity to explain the context underlying the 
reported financials. If such explanations are presented in a complex manner, this may reduce the 
precision of the reported earnings signals. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) show that when investors 
form their demand function as the precision-weighted average of the reporting earnings signal 
(Grossman 1976), lower precision in the information release leads to lower price movements and 
lower trading volume. Thus, we predict a significantly negative association between the Fog (and 
Kincaid) Index and abnormal (i) trading volume and (ii) stock return volatility for foreign firms 
(Landsman et al. 2012), after controlling for the magnitude of the earnings surprise and for a 
variety of country, firm and call characteristics. The results suggest that a one standard deviation 
increase in the Fog index, which is equivalent to the change in complexity of an average firm in 
the U.K. to that of an average firm in China, will lead to a 2% reduction in abnormal volume 
following the conference call. Also, the negative relationship between linguistic complexity and 
capital market variables is stronger for firms domiciled in countries that face higher language 
barriers (e.g., non-English speaking countries with a high EPI).  
In our cross-sectional analysis, we examine whether the capital market response to 
linguistic complexity is more pronounced when investors have greater demand for the English 
conference call information. We measure 1) implicit demand, using the portion of foreign 
investors (or foreign operating activities) and 2) explicit demand, by how actively analysts ask 
questions during calls. We find that the effect of linguistic complexity is limited to firms with a 
greater proportion of foreign investors and more foreign sales.
6 Also, linguistic complexity leads 
to a lower capital market response for calls where analysts are more active in asking questions. 
                                                        
6 Interestingly, when we compare the market reaction of two different shares of an identical firm (e.g., shares cross-
listed in the U.S. and primary shares in the home country), we find that only the cross-listed U.S. shares are affected 
by linguistic complexity in English conference calls, while the domestic listings show no relation between linguistic 
complexity and abnormal trading volume. This effect is limited to smaller firms. (See Section 5.2). 6 
 
Taken together, these results are consistent with linguistic complexity being negatively 
associated with the information content of conference calls when there is greater demand for the 
information conveyed during the English conference call. 
Overall, our results speak to capital market frictions associated with the linguistic 
complexity of foreign firms’ voluntary disclosures. We contribute to the literature in several 
ways. First, we examine the determinants of linguistic complexity in an international setting. 
Unlike most studies that highlight the role of investor protection and rule enforcement in the 
home country as major drivers of disclosure quality, we highlight language barriers as a 
significant factor in the disclosure quality of foreign firms. Foreign firms’ voluntary disclosures 
(e.g., conference calls held in English) provide a unique source of variation in complexity, which 
permits us to examine the implication of linguistic complexity holding the underlying language 
constant. This is one of the first studies to examine the implications of language barriers in a 
voluntary disclosure setting. 
 Second, our results provide new insights into how conference calls provide information 
to the capital markets. Prior research documents that conference calls provide significant 
information to market participants beyond the information contained in the earnings releases 
(Frankel et al. 1999). We show how linguistic complexity in information disclosures can be 
associated with lower information content, as measured by abnormal stock return volatility and 
trading volume. These sets of results most directly add to our understanding of how the form of 
disclosure can affect the information content of earnings news (Landsman et al. 2012; Bushee et 
al. 2011). Finally, our paper responds to a call for research in content analysis of corporate 
disclosure in an international setting (Li 2010). 7 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the prior 
literature and develop our main hypotheses. In section three, we describe our data and empirical 
measures, and present some summary statistics. We present our main results in section four and 
additional analysis in section five. Section six concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review and hypothesis development  
  In this section, we review the strands of literature relevant to our study as they pertain to 
(i) linguistic complexity, (ii) the role of non-financial information in capital markets and (iii) 
conference calls as a vehicle for firm disclosures. The intersection of those literature streams 
leads to our hypotheses. 
2.1  Linguistic complexity 
  The lack of consensus on the definition and measurement of linguistic complexity 
notwithstanding, research in the fields of linguistics and psychology has documented the 
importance of the properties of language vis-à-vis the effectiveness of communication, both 
spoken and written. Of particular interest to our research question is the literature on cross-
language comprehension. The theory of linguistic relativity holds that individuals’ cognitive 
processes are influenced by language (Sapir 1921). Though there is no cohesive conceptual 
framework that encompasses both theoretical and empirical studies of linguistic relativity, the 
collective evidence from a large body of experimental studies suggests that some language 
patterns may influence aspects of thought and behavior (Lucy 1997). In the context of our study, 
this would suggest that corporate managers’ linguistic upbringing could influence the way they 8 
 
communicate with investors, assuming that the manager’s fluency in English is a function of 
their mother tongue.
7 
  The concept of interlanguage, coined by Selinker (1972), supports this assumption. 
Interlanguage is a linguistic system that is based on the observed output from an individual’s 
attempt to learn a second language in comparison to (i) speech in the learners’ native language 
and (ii) speech in the target language by native speakers of those languages. While interlanguage 
is defined from the perspective of the second-language learner (in our context, the manager), one 
can easily flip the perspective to that of the target language speaker with whom the learner 
attempts to communicate (in our context, investors). It follows that interlanguage can also 
measure the level of difficulty the recipients face in understanding the learner’s message, 
especially if they themselves do not speak the learner’s native language. In the context of our 
study, the interlanguage distance the manager exhibits when he/she communicates in a non-
native language (e.g., English) may represent the level of difficulty English speaking investors 
face to process the information.  
As far as we are aware, none of the aforementioned concepts has been used directly in 
capital market research. However, a long-standing literature has analyzed the content of 
corporate financial reports to assess their narrative complexity. Looking mostly at annual reports 
and using well-known proxies such as the Fog and Kincaid Indexes to measure readability, 
studies conclude that annual reports are ‘difficult’ to read for firms domiciled in the U.S. (Li 
2008; Smith and Smith 1971). Similar findings have been documented using the annual reports 
                                                        
7 In our empirical analysis, we use firms’ headquarters location to proxy for their managers’ English proficiency. 
This may result in measurement error for firms that hire foreign managers. While we do not have managers’ 
nationality for all our sample firms, our results are robust to the exclusion of firm-years from non-English speaking 
countries where the CEO, CFO or investor relation officer was born (or educated) in an English-speaking country, as 
per the BoardEx database. 9 
 
of foreign firms in New Zealand (Healy 1977), the U.K. (Jones 1988), Hong Kong (Courtis 
1995), and Italy (Hammami 2011).  
In terms of cross-country linguistic complexity, little research exists that speaks directly 
to our line of inquiry. Two exceptions are Campbell et al. (2005) and Courtis and Hassan (2002). 
Campbell et al. (2005) compare content analyses of voluntary environmental disclosures for 
original documents from German companies and the English translations provided by the same 
company. They find that the English translations are faithful to the German originals, suggesting 
that companies do not discriminate based on reporting jurisdiction. Courtis and Hassan (2002) 
compare the English and Chinese (Malay) versions of annual reports from Hong Kong 
(Malaysian) firms. Their results suggest that the indigenous-language version is more readable 
than the English translation. Thus, prior studies find mixed evidence on whether (written) annual 
reports released in different languages contain different levels of information quality. 
Unlike written reports, which allow sufficient time for the presenter to prepare and the 
receiver to process the information, verbal speeches require almost immediate processing as the 
material is being presented. Thus the interlanguage distance of the presenter (e.g., the manager) 
will be an important determinant of how easily the receiver (e.g., investors) processes the 
information.  Selinker (1972) observes that only about 5% of second-language learners achieve 
native-speaker competence. Unless the top executives of large corporations belong to that group, 
we expect to observe variation in the linguistic complexity of foreign managers’ communication 
in English. Furthermore, we expect the complexity of the disclosures in English to be higher 
when a manager’s firm is located in a country where English is not the primary language. While 
managers may be able to resolve this barrier by hiring a translator, using a translator also adds a 
different processing cost to the communication.  Hence, our first hypothesis is that linguistic 10 
 
complexity in foreign firms English conference calls will increase with the language distance 
between English and the firms’ home countries: 
H1: The linguistic complexity of conference call discussions is greater when the firm is 
headquartered in a country where English is not the primary language.  
2.2  Qualitative information and capital markets 
There exists a long stream of literature on how capital markets react to quantitative 
disclosures. Only recently, have studies begun exploring the capital market implications of 
qualitative information. To illustrate the difference between quantitative and qualitative 
disclosures, consider the task of an investor when evaluating a firm's earnings numbers vs. a 
transcript from a conference call. A net income figure is made up of a single number so that 
investors can easily process the information. The text of a conference call, on the other hand, 
often contains management interpretations and explanations of business operations. The 
information is more descriptive, therefore difficult to summarize and often subject to different 
interpretations.  
One possible reason why processing qualitative information becomes a difficult task is 
because of the “soft” nature of the message being conveyed (Petersen 2004). Because such 
information is descriptive in nature, it may be more difficult to create a summary of its content. 
Understanding the content may require an understanding of the implicit signals inferred during 
the communication process. This implies that the form in which the information is conveyed 
becomes an important factor. If the description of the message is conveyed in a less complex 
manner, this will reduce the confidence interval of the underlying message. Indeed, consistent 
with predictions drawn from research in psychology, Rennekamp (2012) finds that less complex 
disclosure increases investors’ belief in the disclosure’s reliability. Under a rational expectations 11 
 
framework, similar predictions can hold. For instance, Kim and Verrecchia (1991) show that the 
precision of announced information positively affects the volume and variance of the price 
change associated with the announcement. Insofar as message complexity negatively affects 
signal precision, one should observe a negative association between complexity and both trading 
volume and price variance. 
A recent strand of the literature tests hypotheses related to the capital market 
consequences of complexity in corporate disclosures, again based primarily on the periodic 
regulatory filings by U.S. firms (see Li 2010 for a review). Studies show that more complex 
filings can reduce the precision of the reported information and affect investors’ reactions to the 
disclosed information. For example, greater complexity in the text of a firm’s filings is 
associated with greater analyst forecast dispersion and lower accuracy (Lehavy et al. 2011), 
lower trading volume (Miller 2010), less trading by small retail investors (Loughran and 
McDonalds 2010), and greater information asymmetry (Lei 2010). These findings inform our 
own hypothesis development by showing that even within a single country where English is the 
primary language, disclosure readability affects capital market participants’ reaction to the 
information being conveyed.  
2.3  Information content of conference calls 
Conference calls are one of the main voluntary disclosure mechanisms firms employ to 
explain both financial and non-financial information. U.S. based studies find that firms that hold 
conference calls tend to be larger, more profitable, and have greater analyst following (Frankel et 
al. 1999), consistent with investor demand being an important determinant of the firm’s choice to 
hold a conference call. Other studies also find that managers’ incentives to use conference calls 12 
 
as a way to increase their visibility and to explain this period’s performance are additional 
reasons why firms initiate conference calls (Tasker 1998; Bushee et al. 2003).  
In comparison, there is little academic evidence on non-U.S. firms’ use of conference calls. 
Bassemir et al. (2012) examine the conference calls held by German firms listed on the Prime 
Standard Index of the Deutsche Börse. The stock exchange mandates that, as one of the 
disclosure requirements for being part of the index, firms must conduct at least one conference 
call per year. Bassemir et al. (2012) find that firms conduct on average two (mostly closed) calls 
per year, even though they are required to report earnings on a quarterly basis. Meanwhile, using 
a set of Thai firms, Liang et al. (2012) find foreign ownership to be an important motive behind 
firms in emerging markets holding a conference call. Firms may decide to hold conference calls 
based on the institutional features of their home countries and/or the main stock exchange on 
which they are listed. However, to our knowledge, there is no other cross-country study 
investigating conference calls. 
Extant literature also documents that information released during conference calls has 
capital market consequences. Frankel et al. (1999) find increasing returns volatility during the 
conference call period. Bushee et al. (2003) examine open conference calls and find both a 
higher level of trading activity and returns volatility during the conference call period.  Bowen et 
al. (2002) indicate that conference calls enhance analysts’ ability to accurately forecast earnings 
and help level the playing field among analysts. Similarly, Bassemir et al. (2012) find that the 
calls in their German sample are associated with a greater reduction in analyst forecast errors, 
compared to non-call quarters. Of note, they also argue that the economic magnitude of analyst 
forecast error reduction is greater in their German sample than in Bowen et al. (2002). Hence, 
this suggests that the capital market consequences of conference calls may vary across countries. 13 
 
Matsumoto et al. (2012) find that both the presentation and Q&A portions of the calls have 
incremental information content over the earnings press release. Moreover, the Q&A portion 
exhibits greater information content than the management discussion does, and this greater 
information content is positively associated with analyst coverage. These studies suggest that the 
information content of conference calls includes value relevant information for investors.  
2.4  Capital market consequences of linguistic complexity: Hypothesis development 
Based on the intersection of the aforementioned theoretical and empirical findings, we 
formulate two sets of hypotheses regarding the effect of linguistic complexity on the information 
content of conference calls, as measured by trading volume and price variance around the calls. 
Based on the Kim and Verrecchia (1991) model, if investors form their demand function as the 
precision-weighted average of the reported information signals (Grossman 1976), we predict that 
higher linguistic complexity—i.e., lower precision—in the information release during conference 
calls will lead to lower price movements and lower trading volume. Underlying this prediction is 
the assumption that, while quantitative data such as reported earnings remain the main input for 
firm valuation, the narrative around the implications of the current performance on future cash 
flows can affect the precision of the imperfect signal. This can happen for two non-mutually 
exclusive reasons. First, even if managers want to be transparent (as their choice to conduct a 
conference call would suggest), their ability to communicate in English in a non-rehearsed 
setting (the Q&A portion of the conference call) may condition the effectiveness of their answers 
in narrowing investors’ uncertainty around the underlying financial performance signal they are 
reporting. Second, consistent with Li (2008), the management obfuscation hypothesis suggests 
that executives may purposefully communicate in a more complex manner, in order to conceal 
the fact that current negative earnings are likely to persist in the future or high abnormal earnings 14 
 
are likely to soon reverse. Even in this case, we would still expect investors to trade (and/or 
revise their beliefs) less intensely in response to more complex language during conference calls, 
holding the earnings surprise constant. Hence, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H2:   Greater linguistic complexity in foreign firms’ conference calls will decrease the 
extent to which investors react to the information released. 
Our interest is in how the linguistic complexity of conference call discussions – that is, the 
form rather than the content – affects their information content. If linguistic complexity affects 
investors’ response to information disclosure as predicted in H2, we further expect this 
association to vary with demand-side forces (i.e., the mass of users likely to demand information 
from English-language conference calls). The demand can come directly from investors, or from 
information intermediaries such as sell-side analysts. In particular, analysts who participate in 
conference calls have an opportunity to ask managers for clarification in order to form their own 
forecasts of future earnings. The more questions they ask, the more likely it is that the 
management presentation during the conference call elicits uncertainty on the part of analysts 
and investors about the implications of the provided information for firm value. 
Hence, our third hypothesis refines our expectations regarding the association between 
linguistic complexity and the information content of conference calls along the following 
partitions: 
H3:   The effect of linguistic complexity on the information content of earning releases will 
be greater when there is greater implicit (as captured by the presence of foreign investors) or 
explicit (as captured by how actively analysts ask questions) demand for the conference call 
information. 
 15 
 
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Sample 
  We obtain conference call transcripts of non-U.S. firms between 2002 and 2010 from 
Thomson StreetEvents. Table 1 shows the details of the sample selection process. We use all 
conference call transcripts subject to some minimal constraints. First, we drop all conference 
calls that are unrelated to earnings announcements (e.g., M&A conference calls). Second, since 
our interest is in how linguistic complexity in the information disclosure affects the information 
content of the earnings releases, we require the conference calls in our sample to occur near the 
earnings announcement dates. Empirically, we require conference calls to be held within the 3 
days around an earnings announcement.
8, 9 Next, we drop calls that have a length in the bottom 
5% of our sample, measured by the total number of words. This ensures that our complexity 
measure is based on dialogues with sufficient text. Finally, we require firms to have financial 
data (total assets (WC02999), net income (WC01706), common equity (WC03501), and total 
debt (WC03255)) from Worldscope and daily price (RI), volume (VO), and market value (MV) 
data from Datastream. We also obtain analyst data from I/B/E/S and guidance issuance from 
Capital IQ. Our final sample consists of 11,740 conference call observations from 4,757 firms 
domiciled in 41 different countries. 
3.2 Measure of linguistic complexity 
  We use two measures of linguistic complexity. The first measure corresponds to the Fog 
index, which is a widely used measure of complexity in prior literature (e.g., Li 2008; De Franco 
et al. 2012). The measure is calculated as follows: 
                                                        
8 Earnings announcement dates are collected from Bloomberg following Griffin et al. (2008). We thank Emmanuel 
DeGeorge for providing us with the earnings announcement dates of foreign firms.  
9 Consistent with prior literature (Matsumoto et al. 2011) we confirm that the majority of the conference calls (94 %) 
are held on the earnings announcement date or within the 3 days after the earnings announcement. 16 
 
Fog = (Words per sentence + percentage of complex words) * 0.4       
where complex words are measured as words with three or more syllables. The second measure 
we use is the Flesch-Kincaid index, which measures the level of difficulty in comprehending a 
text.
10 The index is calculated as follows:  
Kincaid = C0 * Words per sentences + C1 * Syllables per words - C3.    
where the constant terms (C0= 0.39, C1= 11.8, and C2= 15.59) scale the measure to map into the 
total years of U.S. education required to understand the text.  
  We obtain each measure for the Q&A section of the conference calls, using only the 
transcripts from the answers provided by the management team. That is, we exclude text from 
the questions that are more likely to reflect the fluency of the analysts. We focus on the Q&A 
section of the conference calls because the statements made by managers in the Q&A section are 
more spontaneous and thus less likely to be influenced by a staged preparation (Li 2010).  
  Table 2 provides the average Fog and Kincaid index scores per country, year, and 
industry.  Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for linguistic complexity in our conference 
call sample. We find a mean Fog score of 11.84 (and a median of 11.71) in foreign firm 
conference calls. This is much lower than the mean Fog score of 18.23 (and median 17.98) found 
in the annual reports of U.S. based studies (Li 2008). The large difference likely reflects the 
inherent difference in the levels of complexity in written reports and the spoken language used 
during conference calls. We find that the mean Kincaid score of complexity in the conference 
calls is 9.01, indicating that the transcripts are comprehensible to a high school freshman. This 
value is similar to the mean score of 8.48 documented by De Franco et al. (2012) for analysts’ 
reports. 
                                                        
10 Examples of prior capital-market studies that use Kincaid include the following: Smith and Smith 1971, 
Healy 1977, Li 2008, De Franco et al. 2012. 17 
 
  Panel B presents the number of observations and mean complexity scores for the 41 
countries included in our sample. Our sample comprises a cross-section of both English speaking 
and non-English speaking countries. The countries with the higher Fog  scores are China, 
Portugal, and Turkey, while those that exhibit the lowest scores are Thailand, Taiwan and 
Malaysia. This could reflect country-level determinants as a possible driver of linguistic 
complexity but may also indicate the different types of firms that hold English conference calls 
in each country.   
  We also find great variation in linguistic complexity within countries, highlighting the 
importance of firm-level characteristics as another driver of linguistic complexity. In untabulated 
analysis, we find that the average standard deviation of the Fog score within each country is 1.38, 
which is higher than the 0.74 standard deviation in the mean Fog score across countries (Table 
2). Thus, we include various firm-level determinants throughout our main empirical analysis and 
conduct a cross-sectional analysis to examine the differential effect of linguistic complexity by 
certain firm- and conference call-characteristics.  
  Panel C presents the distribution of linguistic complexity across industries using the 
Industry Classification Benchmark industry codes. The financial industry exhibits the highest 
level of linguistic complexity (a Fog  score of 12.45 for banks), followed by the 
telecommunications industry. In our empirical analysis, we include industry fixed effects to 
control for systematic differences in linguistic complexity across industries that do not vary over 
time. Finally, Panel D presents the distribution across years. Both measures appear to be stable 
over time, especially from 2005 onward. Nonetheless, we include year fixed effects to control for 
systematic changes in linguistic complexity over time. 
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4.  Empirical tests and results 
4.1 Determinants of linguistic complexity in foreign firm conference calls 
  We begin by examining the determinants of linguistic complexity in a multivariate 
regression setting. We use the following empirical model:  
Complexityi,t = β1 * Language Barrier + ∑ βk * Controlsi,t+ Year FE + Industry FE + εi,t.      (1) 
We use Fog and Kincaid described earlier in Section 3.2 to measure linguistic complexity in 
conference calls. We first examine whether linguistic complexity is associated with the language 
barrier measured as the level of English proficiency in the firm’s home country. We proxy for 
language barrier using two measures. First, we use the inverse of the English Proficiency Index 
(EPIc), a continuous measure of English proficiency in the firm’s home country. The index is 
developed by EF Education First and measures a nation’s average English proficiency. The index 
is based on the test scores of 2.3 million adults who took an online English test from 2007 to 
2009. Second, we use the Language Distancec between the English language and the country’s 
dominant language, as designed by Grimes and Grimes (1996). The distance is based on a 
classification system that groups languages together by families (e.g., Sino-Tibetan, Altaic, Indo-
European) and up to three levels of branches and sub-branches within each family. English is 
classified under the Altaic family, within the Germanic branch and the Western/North Sea sub-
branch (see Dow and Karunaratna 2006, for a summarized classification of 88 languages 
according to Grimes and Grimes 1996). Each country is given a score based on the distance 
between its dominant language and English as follows: 5 if it is from a different family, 4 same 
family but different branches, 3 same branch but different at the first sub-branch level, 2 same 
sub-branch at the first level but different at the second level, and 1 if it is the same language. The 
main advantage of this variable is to account for fundamental differences between languages in a 19 
 
non-binary fashion (i.e., English versus not), recognizing that it is likely easier for a non-native 
English speaker to learn English if her native language is in the same branch (e.g., German or 
Dutch) than if it is in a different family (e.g., Spanish or Mandarin).   
  In addition, we include various country-level determinants that capture the information 
environment in each country. We include price synchronicity (Synchronicityc,t), which measures 
the level of firm-specific information in stock price and Zero Returnsc,t, which captures price 
informativeness and liquidity. We predict a more transparent (liquid) information environment 
(i.e., lower price synchronicity and less frequent zero returns, respectively) to be associated with 
lower level of linguistic complexity. Finally, we control for the financial development in the 
country, using the log of equity market capitalization (Market Capc,t) and the annual changes in 
the market index (Market Returnc,t). We also account for cultural differences across countries 
that may explain variation in foreign managers’ communication in English, without being 
necessarily a reflection of fluency per se. In particular, we include the Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index developed by Hofstede (1983). The index is defined as the degree to which the members 
of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. It is a function of rules 
orientation, employment stability and stress at work. Country-level aversion for uncertainty is 
likely to be reflected in linguistic patterns that may affect how managers express themselves in 
English. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the appendix. 
  Following Li (2008), we include various firm-level determinants that have been shown to 
be associated with the level of complexity in financial reports.
11  Size is defined as the log market 
value of equity measured in U.S. dollars and captures many aspects of a firm’s operations that 
                                                        
11   Li (2008) examines complexity in the written text of financial reports while we examine the level of 
comprehension in verbal speeches. The complexity of written texts and verbal speeches might be driven by different 
factors. Nonetheless, since we attempt to explain variation in the common underlying construct – complexity – Li’s 
analysis provides an obvious baseline for our examination.  20 
 
are related to disclosure practices (Lang and Lundholm 1996). We include Q – defined as the log 
market value of assets over book value of assets – to capture the investment opportunity and 
growth potential of the firm. Bushee et al. (2003) argue that firms with higher Q are those with 
business models where it is more difficult to assess the valuation implications based on the 
firm’s reported financial numbers. We control for Leverage, defined as total debt over book 
value of assets, to control for the differential incentives management may face when firms have 
greater levels of debt and resulting agency costs by releasing more information (Frankel et al. 
1999). We also include other proxies for the information environment such as number of analyst 
(Log_analysts) and cross-listed firms (ADR) to account for differences in disclosure behavior 
driven by the demand side.   
  While the level of complexity in conference call disclosures may be driven by a firm’s 
innate characteristics, it is also possible that strategic disclosure choices may drive the level of 
complexity in the firm’s disclosure. For example, firms may obfuscate the message delivery 
when the underlying performance is weaker than are the reported figures. If complexity is indeed 
a choice variable for the firm, this implies that the level of complexity may change with the 
properties of reported earnings. In addition to including profits (ROA) in the determinants model, 
we include various conference call characteristics that capture the transparency in the message 
delivery process. For example, we include indicators for conference calls where the manager was 
reluctant to provide information, and for those where at least one answer was unclear to the 
analysts. Reluctant is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the manager provides 
answers that show he does not want to directly address a question (e.g., “cannot answer”) and 
zero otherwise; Unclear is defined as one if the analysts mention that they did not understand the 
manager or ask for the manager to repeat the information, and zero otherwise. We control for the 21 
 
lack of vocal clarity of managers’ answers by counting incidences of “[inaudible]” in the 
transcripts (Inaudible).  Inaudible, which is likely correlated with managers’ communication 
skills in English, should exhibit a negative association with information content of conference 
calls, assuming investors are as likely as professional transcribers to not understand what the 
speaker says. We include a Translation indicator for conference calls that used a professional 
translator and a Quarter dummy to control for the differential information content of conference 
calls in the fourth quarter versus interim periods. Finally, we control for the management team’s 
prior experience with English conference calls using the total number of previous English 
conference calls held by the firm (# Previous Calls). 
  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the determinants included in the study. We 
present the results for the entire conference call sample and separately for calls of firms in 
English-speaking and non-English speaking countries. Panel A shows that our sample for 
English and non-English speaking countries is balanced, with 4,802 and 6,933 firm-quarter 
observations, respectively. English and non-English speaking countries differ along several 
dimensions. In terms of country level variables, English-speaking countries show a greater 
proportion of zero returns than non-English speaking countries do (0.56 versus 0.36) and lower 
stock market synchronicity. In terms of firm characteristics, our sample of English-speaking 
countries consists of smaller firms, but with greater analyst following. In terms of conference call 
characteristics, firms in non-English speaking countries show a higher number of words per 
conference calls and also more likely to issue guidance. In addition, managers are, on average, 
more likely to be unclear, reluctant to answer questions and inaudible in non-English speaking 
countries. Panel B presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables included 
in equation (1). Fog and Kincaid are highly correlated at 0.98, suggesting that both measures 22 
 
capture largely similar variations in linguistic complexity. Greater complexity is positively 
associated with firm size (Spearman = 0.07) and leverage (Spearman = 0.05) and negatively 
associated with growth opportunities q (Spearman = –0.03) and analyst coverage (Spearman = –
0.07). We next present a multivariate analysis of the determinants model in equation (1). 
We test our first hypothesis that linguistic complexity will be positively associated with 
language barriers. The estimated results are presented in Table 4. We include both year and 
industry fixed effects to control for the systematic differences in the complexity measures over 
time and across industries shown earlier in Table 2.
12 Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
by year.  
Table 4 shows that linguistic complexity is positively associated with the language barrier 
in the firm’s home country. We measure language barrier using 1) the inverse of the English 
Proficiency Index (EPIc*(-1)) and 2) the language distance between the home country’s main 
language and English (Language Distancec). The estimated coefficient on EPI*(-1) is positive 
and significant, 0.02 (t-stat=2.76) using Fog in model (1) and 0.02 (t-stat=2.22) using Kincaid in 
model (3). The estimated coefficients suggest that a one standard deviation decrease (=7.97, 
Table 2) in the EPI score is associated with a 0.15 higher level of Fog score. Using the second 
measure, Language Distancec, we find that the coefficient on language barrier is positive and 
significant, 0.05 (t-value=1.82) using Fog in model (1) but only marginally significant 0.04 (t-
value=1.54) using Kincaid in model (3). This suggests that a higher language barrier leads to 
greater linguistic complexity in the disclosure of foreign firms, despite the fact that our sample 
consists—at least to some extent—of large global corporations that choose to communicate 
directly with investors through conference calls.  
                                                        
12 Because many of the country-level determinants, e.g., language barrier, lack time-series variation, we cannot 
include country fixed effects. 23 
 
Also, we find evidence that linguistic complexity is associated with various firm- and 
conference call-characteristics. Firm-level determinants show that smaller firms (size) that have 
less analyst following (Log_analysts) exhibit a higher level of linguistic complexity, although the 
association with analyst following is not statistically significant. This is consistent with linguistic 
complexity reflecting the poor information environment of small firms with low visibility (Li 
2008; De Franco et al. 2012). Also, longer conference calls (Words) and those where a translator 
is used (Translation) show a higher level of complexity, while conference calls where managers 
are either reluctant to or unclear in providing information show a lower complexity.  
4.2 Capital market consequences of linguistic complexity 
  4.2.1  Measures of capital market reaction 
To capture the capital market consequences of linguistic complexity in conference calls, 
we examine the trading volume and variability of price around conference calls dates. Lev 
(1989) describes an information release as being useful if it entails greater changes in the stock 
price or trading volume from the capital market. Long-standing research from Ball and Brown 
(1968) and Beaver (1968) suggests that more information content in reported earnings releases 
will lead to greater price movements and trading volume.
13,14 If complexity affects the usefulness 
of the information being released, we expect more complexity to reduce the information content 
of the conference calls, leading to less trade volume and smaller price movements. 
                                                        
13 Kim and Verrecchia (1997) interpret trading volume as capturing idiosyncratic interpretations of the earnings 
releases. A higher abnormal volume will represent the divergent opinions of investors. Thus, another interpretation 
of our measure of information content is that more informative earnings will lead investors to more actively interpret 
the announced news. 
14 Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) demonstrate that abnormal return variance and trading volume are equally 
valid measures of information content, defined as a signal that alters investors’ beliefs. 24 
 
We follow Landsman et al. (2012) and DeFond et al. (2007), and measure the 
information content of the conference calls using abnormal volume and abnormal return 
volatility.  
Abnormal volume (AVOL):  Our measure of abnormal trading volume corresponds to the mean 
event-period volume divided by the average-estimation-period volume. Since the measure is 
highly skewed we use the log of the ratio (Landsman et al., 2012). Hence, we define AVOL as: 
i,t
i,t
i,t
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AVOL log
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= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
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where    is the average trading volume of firm i over a three-day window, t= –1,0,+1. Vi is the 
average daily trading volume for firm i for days t–60 to t–10 and t+10 to t+60 relative to the 
conference call date (t=0). 
Abnormal returns variance (AVAR): To obtain our measure of abnormal return variance, we first 
calculate the daily market-adjusted returns as: 
ui,t =Ri,t – (αi,t + βi,t Rm,t). 
where Ri,t  is the stock return of firm i on day t, and Rm,t is the return of the Datastream Global 
market index in the country of firm i. Both αi,t and βi,t  are obtained by estimating each parameter 
during the non-event period which corresponds to  t–60 to t–10 and t+10 to t+60 relative to the 
conference call date t=0. Following Landsman et al. (2012) and DeFond et al. (2007), we 
measure abnormal volatility as  the mean of the squared market model adjusted returns divided 
by the variance of firm i’s market model residuals during the non-event period. AVARi,t  is given 
by: 
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where 
2
i,t μ  is the average squared market model adjusted returns of firm i for days t= –1,0,+1 and 
2
i,t σ is the variance of firm i’s market model residuals for days t–60 to t–10 and t+10 to t+60 
relative to the conference call date (t=0).  
  Table 3 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for AVARi,t  and AVOLi,t  and other controls 
included in the study. We present descriptives for the entire conference call sample as well as for 
calls of firms in English-speaking and non-English speaking countries. Panel A shows that the 
mean and median AVARi,t    and  AVOLi,t  are significantly larger in firms from non-English 
speaking countries than they are for firms in English speaking countries, suggesting that the two 
variables show systematic differences across the two sub-samples. The mean AVARi,t, 0.34, 
represents an unlogged value of 2.18. While the theoretical value of the unlogged value should 
equal one, we find slightly higher values because most of our conference call sample includes the 
earnings announcement periods.  In our subsequent analysis, we also examine the effect of 
linguistic complexity on the two capital market variables for each country-partition. 
4.2.2  The story in pictures 
  We first present a graphical representation of the changes in the capital market variables 
for the periods leading up to and immediately following the conference calls. Figure 1 shows the 
movements in AVARi,t  and AVOLi,t before and after the conference calls for firms in the highest 
and lowest complexity quartiles. The horizontal axis is the days before and after the conference 
calls; it ranges from –10 days to +10 days. We form the portfolios for each fiscal quarter by 
double-sorting first on the number of words and then on the capital market variable of interest 
(Dechow and Dichev 2002) to ensure that differences in the amount of information released 
during the calls do not drive the difference in the response of the capital market variables. 26 
 
Figure 1, Panel A shows the movement in AVARi,t before and after the conference call dates. 
Panel A shows a steep spike in AVARi,t on the day of the conference call (from t= –1 to t=0). This 
immediately reverses back to its normal level two days after the conference calls. More 
importantly, we find that firms with a low level of linguistic complexity (measured using the Fog 
score) show a greater increase in AVARi,t  relative to those with high linguistic complexity. 
Similarly, in Panel B, we plot movement in AVOLi,t surrounding the conference call dates for 
firms in the highest and lowest linguistic complexity quartiles. We find that firms with higher 
linguistic complexity experience less AVOLi,t  surrounding the conference call dates.  Consistent 
with prior literature (Beaver 1968), we find that AVOLi,t  dissipates slowly and the speed at which 
AVOLi,t  reverts to its expected level is similar across firms with high and low complexity 
quartiles. The similar reversion speed rules out difference in the level of investor attention as an 
explanation for the difference in the level of AVOLi,t  across the samples of high and low 
linguistic complexity firms. However, we cannot draw any inferences from the univariate results 
in these figures beyond those that are largely descriptive in nature, therefore, turn to our 
multivariate analysis. 
4.2.3    Multivariate analysis  
  We test our second hypothesis, which predicts that greater linguistic complexity will 
reduce the information content of the information releases. We estimate the following regression 
model using ordinary least squares (OLS): 
AVOLi,t (AVARi,t ) = β1 * Complexityi,t + β2 * SUEi,t+∑k  βk * Controli,t + Fixed eff. + ei,t.   (2) 
Where  AVOLi,t is abnormal volume in the 3-day conference call announcement window as 
described in section 4.2.  AVARi,t is abnormal stock price variance in the 3-day window around 
the conference call announcement. Complexityi,t is the Fog score or the Kincaid score described 27 
 
in section 3.2. We control for SUEi,t, defined as the absolute difference between the actual annual 
earnings (per share) minus the most recent mean consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the actual 
earnings per share. It is important to control for the level of earnings surprise during the 
conference call because this may be an important omitted variable that affects both linguistic 
complexity and our dependent variable. We also include an indicator for firms that issue 
guidance during (or within 10 days of) the call. Calls that include a discussion of quantitative 
forward looking information are likely to elicit a greater market reaction, insofar as management 
forecasts tend to be informative (see Radhakrishnan et al. 2012 for evidence in an international 
setting). However, the provision of this information (i.e., management guidance) may also 
reduce the weight that investors place on the qualitative information that is provided during the 
conference calls. As in our previous tests, we control for various firm, country, and conference 
call level variables, defined in the appendix. Finally, we include year, industry, and country fixed 
effects to control for the systematic differences in the capital market variables over time and 
across industries and countries. 
Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (2). In columns 1 and 2, we present 
the regression specification of linguistic complexity and the control variables using AVOLi,t  as 
the dependent variable. Column 1 shows that the coefficient for Fog is negative and statistically 
significant (coef. = –0.01, t-stat = –2.34). The estimated coefficient suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in linguistic complexity, which amounts to a change in complexity from an 
average firm in the U.K. to an average firm in China, will lead to a 1.5% reduction in abnormal 
volume following the conference call. Also, the coefficient on SUE is positive and significant, 
confirming the well-known earnings announcement effect documented in prior literature (Ball 
and Brown 1968). This suggests that greater linguistic complexity is associated with less 
information content, after controlling for the earnings surprise news.  28 
 
In column 2, we find similar results using Kincaid as our measure of linguistic 
complexity. Column 2 shows a significant negative coefficient for Kincaid (coef. = –0.01, t-stat 
= –2.58) suggesting that linguistic complexity is correlated with abnormal volume around the 3-
day window. The estimated coefficients on the control variables show that AVOLi,t is positively 
associated with the firm’s information environment. Firms in countries with lower price 
synchronicity (Synchronicity), those with more analyst following (Log_analysts), and with U.S. 
listed depository receipts (ADR) show greater abnormal volume during conference calls. We find 
that the frequency of zero  returns is negatively associated with AVOLi,t, consistent with an 
environment of low liquidity. Also, at the conference call level, longer conference calls (Words), 
those that do not report losses (Dloss) and those that issue guidance exhibit greater abnormal 
volume during the conference call window. 
In Columns 3 and 4, we repeat the estimation using abnormal stock price variance 
(AVARi,t) as the dependent variable. Column 4 in Table 5 shows that the coefficient for Kincaid 
is statistically significant (t-stat = –1.67). In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in 
Kincaid (which equals 1.46 in Table 2, Panel A) translates to approximately a 3% reduction in 
abnormal stock price volatility. Overall, the results presented in Table 5 indicate that greater 
linguistic complexity leads to lower information content in the information releases, consistent 
with our second hypothesis.  
4.3 Cross sectional tests  
In this section, we test our final hypothesis, which predicts that the effect of linguistic 
complexity will be greater when there is greater demand for the information released during the 
conference calls. We measure investors’ demand for information 1) directly, using the number of 
questions raised during conference calls and 2) indirectly, using the characteristics of the investor 
base. To test this hypothesis, we partition the sample into two high and low demand sub-samples 29 
 
and estimate equation (2) separately. We examine whether the effect of linguistic complexity is 
greater in the high demand sub-sample. We measure investor demand using three proxies.  
Our first partition is the number of questions raised during the conference calls. Prior 
research has established that the questions asked during conference calls lead to releases of 
important information (Matsumoto et al. 2011; Hollander et al. 2010; Mayew and 
Venkatachalam 2012). Analysts who ask questions are likely to provide more informative 
forecast revisions following a conference call relative to those who did not participate (Mayew et 
al. 2011). This implies that the questions asked during conference calls represent relevant 
information gathering activities on the analysts’ part. Thus, we use the number of questions 
analysts ask, scaled by the total number of analysts participating in the call, as our first measure 
of level of demand for information released therein.      
Our second partition is based on the percentage of the firm’s foreign investor base. Prior 
literature finds that, when investing abroad, foreign investors are more likely to rely on public 
information and less on private information sources (Aggarwal et al. 2005).  Thus we assume 
that firms with a greater foreign investor base will have a greater implicit demand for English 
conference calls. We predict that firms with a greater foreign investor base will exhibit a greater 
capital market response to linguistic complexity. We collect foreign investor holdings using the 
percentage of foreign institutional holdings using the Thomson Financials international mutual 
fund database.  
Our third partition is the level of the firm’s foreign operating activities in relation to all 
firm activities, using the % of U.S. sales. Prior studies find that firms with more interactions with 
foreign markets are more likely to provide disclosures on par with global standards (Bradshaw et 
al. 2004; Khanna et al. 2004). We argue that firms with greater interactions with the U.S. market 
will have greater demand for English conference calls from their U.S. stakeholders (e.g., 
customers and employers). We collect U.S. sales information from Thomson Worldscope 30 
 
(WC08731). For firms with missing U.S. sales information, we assume the U.S. sales figure to 
be zero.  
Table 6 shows the estimated results across the three cross-sections. For each partitioning 
variable, we divide the sample into two high and low demand sub-samples using the annual 
sample median. Panel A shows the estimated results using AVOL as the dependent variable. We 
find that when the Intensity of question is high (Column 2) the coefficient of –0.02 on Fog is 
negative and statistically significant. In contrast, when the Intensity of question is low (Column 
1) the coefficient on Fog is negative but insignificant. Furthermore, the difference between the 
coefficients on Fog across the two samples is statistically different from zero (p-value of 0.04).
15 
For our partitions on Foreign ownership and Foreign activities, we find that the coefficients on 
Fog  are  statistically significant only for the high partitions. For the low partitions, the 
coefficients on Fog are negative but insignificant. The differences between the coefficients are 
statistically significant for the Foreign ownership partition (p-value= 0.05) but insignificant for 
the Foreign activities partition (p-value= 0.21). In Panel B, we show the estimated results using 
Kincaid as our measure of linguistic complexity. We find largely similar results. Overall, the 
results in Table 6 provide evidence consistent with our third hypothesis. The effect of linguistic 
complexity on the information content of earnings releases is driven by firms from which there is 
greater demand for conference call information. 
 
5. Additional analysis 
5.1 Effect of linguistic complexity pre and post IFRS adoption 
                                                        
15 We test for the difference in coefficients using a bootstrap test. We randomly assign the distance classification to 
each observation and estimate model (2) for the pseudo high and low demand group, respectively. We then compute 
a pseudo difference in coefficients for the high and low demand group. Repeating this procedure 1,000 times yields 
a null distribution of the difference in coefficients, which we use to test the significance of the difference in 
coefficients. 31 
 
We examine how investors’ ability to process conference call information varies by the 
quality of the firm’s mandatory disclosure. If voluntary and mandatory disclosures are 
complements, this suggests that an improvement in the quality of mandatory disclosure will also 
improve the processing ability of voluntary disclosures (e.g., conference calls). However, if 
investors use the two disclosure mechanisms as substitutes, this implies that improvements in 
mandatory disclosure will reduce the investor’s reliance on voluntary disclosures. In this section, 
we use IFRS as the time-series change in the quality of mandatory disclosure across countries 
and ask how the effect of linguistic complexity in voluntary disclosure (i.e., conference calls) 
changed following the mandatory IFRS adoption.  
The mandatory adoption of IFRS is one of the largest changes in mandatory disclosure 
around the globe (Daske et al. 2008). Studies show that IFRS creates a common framework for 
financial reporting, allowing users to better compare information across countries (Hail et al. 
2010; DeFond et al 2011). Also, studies find that IFRS adoption reduced the information 
processing cost of foreign investors leading to higher demand for IFRS adopting firms (Yu 
2011).  Therefore, if investors use mandatory filings and conference calls as substitutes, we 
expect IFRS adoption to reduce the weight investors place on linguistic complexity when 
processing the information disclosed during conference calls. Consistent with the substitution 
effect of IFRS vis-à-vis alternative sources of information, Brochet et al. (2012) find that IFRS 
adoption leads to a decrease in the informativeness of corporate insider trades and analyst 
recommendations. However, if investors use conference calls and mandatory filings as 
complements, we expect IFRS adoption to lead to an even greater reliance on conference calls, 
increasing the relevance of linguistic complexity during conference calls. 32 
 
  We re-run our main analyses and compare the effect of linguistic complexity pre- and 
post-IFRS adoption. We expand equation (2) and examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
using the following model:  
AVOLi,t  (AVARi,t ) = β1 * Complexityi,t * Post IFRSi,t + β2 * Post IFRSi,t + β3 * Complexityi,t  
+ β4 * SUEi,t+∑k  βk * Controli,t + Fixed effects + ei,t.    (3) 
Post IFRSi,t is an indicator that takes a value of one for the years after IFRS was required in the 
firm’s country and zero otherwise. We concentrate on the mandatory adoption of IFRS and 
exclude firms that voluntarily adopted the set of standards. β1 is our main variable of interest, 
which identifies the changes in the effect of linguistic complexity following mandatory IFRS 
adoption.  
Table 7 Panel A shows the estimated results of equation (3). Column 1 shows the effect 
of linguistic complexity, measured using the Fog index, on abnormal volume. We find a positive 
β1 (coefficient = 0.02, t-stat = 2.06), suggesting that following IFRS adoption, the negative effect 
of linguistic complexity on the information content of conference calls is reduced. In column 2, 
we repeat our analysis using only the countries from non-adopting countries. Post IFRSi,t is now 
an indicator that takes a value of one for 2005, the year most mandatory adopters required IFRS 
adoption, and for subsequent years. Surprisingly, we find that the coefficient on β1 is 
significantly negative, suggesting an increase in the capital market consequences of linguistic 
complexity for firms not reporting under IFRS in more recent times. However, this also indicates 
that the positive coefficient observed in column 1 cannot be explained by the unobserved 
structural changes that occurred around the time of IFRS adoption. Column 3 and 4 repeat the 
analysis using AVARi,t as the dependent variable. We find that β1 is positive but statistically 
insignificant when we use abnormal returns volatility as the dependent variable. In Panel B, we 33 
 
repeat our analysis using Kincaid as our measure of linguistic complexity; we find very similar 
results. Overall, we find some evidence of improvement in the quality of mandatory disclosure 
(i.e., IFRS adoption) reducing the effect of linguistic complexity in voluntary disclosure (i.e., 
conference calls).
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5.2 Cross-listed firms: The differential effect of linguistic complexity for shares listed in 
the home country and shares listed in the U.S. 
One potential concern with our empirical test is that linguistic complexity may be 
confounded by other factors that simultaneously affect the capital market reactions during the 
calls. For example, one can argue that firms with more linguistic complexity in the calls are those 
that are less likely to actively disseminate the call information; hence, dissemination activity will 
represent an omitted variable in our analysis.   
To address this concern, we use cross-listed firms and compare the price and volume 
reaction to linguistic complexity of the two different securities of an identical firm (e.g., the 
ADR security and the primary security of a cross-listed firm). Although representing only a 
limited portion of our sample, cross-listed firms offer a unique opportunity to compare the 
market reaction of shares with different investor bases, while holding all other firm 
characteristics constant. We predict that linguistic complexity will have a greater effect on the 
shares with a more global investor base (i.e., ADR securities) than the shares with more local 
investor base (i.e., security in the home country).  
We identify cross-listed firms using Citibank’s ADR database and use Datastream to 
collect the returns and volume information of securities in the home country. We use CRSP to 
collect returns and volume information of the corresponding ADR security. This process yields 
                                                        
16 This is also consistent with IFRS partially homogenizing the narrative of conference calls, as call participants 
discuss the latest financials using a framework that it better understood by an international audience. 34 
 
1,368 conference call observations with sufficient returns data for both the home country and the 
ADR security. 
Table 8 shows the estimated results across the two different sub-samples. The first two 
columns show the estimated results using AVOL as the dependent variable, using the entire 
sample. For both the home-country security (column 1) and the ADR security (column 2) the 
effect of linguistic complexity, measured using Fog is positive yet insignificant. One explanation 
for this finding is that cross-listed firms are global firms that voluntarily bond to the U.S. capital 
market and thus unlikely to show great variation in their level of linguistic complexity. 
Interestingly, once we limit our sample to firms that are likely to be limited in their resources to 
improve disclosure quality (e.g., small sized firms), we find meaningful differences. 
Model (3) and (4) show the estimated results using only the subsample of small firms. 
We use the sample median in each year to classify firms into small and large firms. We find that 
the coefficient on Fog for the home country security (column 3) is negative but statistically 
insignificant. In contrast, when we examine the ADR security of the same firms, the coefficient 
on Fog is significant and negative (column 4). This suggests that for smaller firms, linguistic 
complexity will have a greater effect on the shares that have a more global investor base. We 
interpret this as the demand for the English conference calls arising in part from the global 
investors affecting the market reaction to linguistic complexity.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We examine the linguistic complexity of conference calls held in English by firms 
headquartered outside of the U.S. and the consequences of such complexity for the information 
content of the calls. We posit that language barrier affects managers’ ability to communicate 35 
 
with investors in a simple manner. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the complexity 
of conference call discussions, as measured by the Fog and Kincaid Indexes, is negatively 
associated with the country-level English proficiency of the firm’s headquarters. Next, we 
hypothesize that investors react less intensively to conference calls when the narrative of those 
calls is more complex. This is because more complex language decreases the precision of the 
signal associated with a given piece of information, such as an earnings surprise. We find 
evidence consistent with our hypothesis. That is, abnormal trading volume and stock price 
variance in a short window around a conference call are negatively associated with the linguistic 
complexity of that call. Moreover, we find that the effect is significant in partitions where (i) the 
firm has a greater proportion of its sales or investor base abroad and (ii) when analysts are more 
active in asking questions during the call. This is consistent with linguistic complexity affecting 
investors’ belief when there is more implicit or explicit demand for the information.  
Our study is the first to analyze conference calls in a cross-country setting. We find that the 
linguistic complexity of calls varies with country-level factors such as language barriers, but also 
with firm characteristics. Furthermore, we show that linguistic complexity has capital market 
consequences. Our results can be informative to foreign firms that wish to communicate with 
investors globally. Analysts around the world may also find the results informative, as they 
might be able to push managers to speak in a less complex manner. Our study also responds to a 
call for research on the content analysis of non-U.S. firms’ disclosures (Li 2010). We believe 
there is much more to examine in an international setting, using conference calls or other venues.  36 
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Figure 1: Capital market reaction to conference calls by level of linguistic complexity 
 
Panel A: Abnormal volume for firms with high and low linguistic complexity 
 
 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns volatility for firms with high and low linguistic complexity 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the movements in abnormal return volatility and abnormal volume before and after 
conference calls for firms in the highest and lowest linguistic complexity quartiles (based on the Fog Index). We 
form the portfolios for each fiscal quarter by double sorting first on the number of words and then on the capital 
market variable of interest (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Abnormal volume corresponds to the daily volume divided 
by the average non-event period volume. Abnormal return volatility corresponds to the daily squared market model 
adjusted returns divided by the variance of the market model residuals during the non-event period. The non-event 
period corresponds to days t-60 to t-10 and t+10 to t+60 relative to the conference call date (t=0). 
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Table 1 Sample selection 
# of conference calls  # of firm-years
Number of conference call transcripts 2002-2010  25,830   7,925 
Less: Analyst calls etc.  (4,911)  (412)
Less: Short conference calls  (814)  (203)
20,105   7,310 
Less: Missing identifiers, Years  (7,394)  (2,126)
12,711   5,184 
Less: Incomplete returns  (85)  (43)
Less: Incomplete financials  (886)  (384)
Total number  of observations  11,740   4,757 
Notes: This table presents the sample selection procedure. We limit our sample to conference calls that occur within 
the 3 days around an earnings announcement and the top 95% of our sample, measured using total number of words. 
We require firms to have financial data from Worldscope, and daily transaction data from Datastream. 42 
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Table 2 Distribution of linguistic complexity of foreign firm conference calls 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of linguistic complexity 
Variable  N  Mean  ST Dev  P10  P25  P50   P75  P90 
Fog 11,740  11.84  1.59  9.92  10.76 11.71 12.76 13.88 
Kincaid 11,740  9.01 1.46 7.26 8.02 8.89 9.85  10.89 
 Panel B: Distribution of linguistic complexity by country 
Countries 
Total # of 
firm-quarters 
Language 
Distance 
EPI 
Mean Fog 
score 
Mean 
Kincaid   
Countries 
Total # of 
firm-quarters 
Language 
Distance 
EPI 
Mean Fog 
score 
Kincaid 
Argentina  37  5  53.49  13.00  9.90 Luxembourg  90  2  .  12.91 9.98 
Australia  207  1  69.90  11.94  9.16 Malaysia  14  5 55.54  10.86 7.99 
Austria  122  2  58.58  11.97  9.17 Mexico  87  5 51.48  11.77 8.79 
Belgium 258 2  57.23  11.90  9.11  Netherlands 385  2  67.93  11.70  8.92 
Brazil  81  5  47.27  11.89  8.87 New  Zealand  8  1 69.90  11.48 8.76 
Canada  3739  1  69.90  11.58  8.78 Norway  348  3 69.09  11.99 9.25 
Chile  2  5  44.63  12.65  9.72 Pakistan  2  1 69.90  11.64 8.62 
China 33  5  47.62  13.29  10.44  Poland 23  5  54.62  13.00  10.10 
Czech Rep.  18  5  51.31  12.98  9.94  Portugal 136  5  53.62  13.24  10.15 
Denmark  317  3  66.58  11.95  9.19 Singapore  66  1 69.90  10.98 8.32 
Finland  432  5  61.25  11.86  9.07 South  Africa  56  1 69.90  11.77 8.95 
France  625  5  53.16  11.90  8.97 South  Korea  71  5 54.19  11.64 8.94 
Germany  1116  2  56.64  11.83  9.04 Spain  251  5 49.01  12.51 9.36 
Greece 148  4  .  12.22  9.26  Sweden 735  5  66.26  11.28  8.62 
Hong  Kong  68  1  54.44  12.26  9.42 Switzerland  414  2 54.60  12.02 9.21 
Hungary  73  5  50.80  12.32  9.41 Taiwan  53  5 48.93  10.26 7.65 
India  42  1  47.35  11.61  8.82 Thailand  15  5 39.41  10.22 7.49 
Indonesia 2  5  44.78  11.30  8.39  Turkey  36  4  37.66  13.19  10.24 
Ireland  86  1  69.90  12.49  9.72 UK  528  1 69.90  11.84 9.03 
Israel  326  5  .  11.72  8.89  St. deviation of            
Italy 577  5  49.05  12.94  9.86    Country mean    1.77  9.75  0.74  0.66 
    44 
 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel C Distribution of linguistic complexity by ICB industry classification 
Industry Description 
Total # of  Mean  Mean 
firm-quarters  Fog score   Kincaid 
Oil & Gas  900 11.74  8.97 
Chemicals  360 11.89  9.08 
Basic Resources  1,009 11.39  8.66 
Construction & Materials  480 11.37  8.59 
Industrial Goods & Services  1,550 11.66  8.86 
Automobiles & Parts  204 11.55  8.78 
Food & Beverage  305 12.00  9.18 
Personal & Household Goods  420 11.39  8.67 
Health Care  795 12.05  9.30 
Retail  457 11.61  8.85 
Media  559 12.03  9.08 
Travel & Leisure  493 11.89  9.04 
Telecommunications  649 12.31  9.41 
Utilities  451 12.27  9.25 
Banks  825 12.45  9.51 
Insurance  414 12.24  9.23 
Real Estate  253 11.14  8.32 
Financial Services & Investments  384 11.88  8.98 
Technology  1232 11.88  9.09 
 
Panel D Distribution of linguistic complexity by year 
Year 
Total # of  Mean  Mean 
firm-quarters Fog  score  Kincaid 
2002  24 12.44 9.67 
2003  463 12.33 9.49 
2004  892 12.30 9.46 
2005  1,135 11.75  8.95 
2006  1,462 11.81  8.98 
2007  1,770 11.90  9.06 
2008  2,079 11.77  8.94 
2009  2,104 11.70  8.86 
2010  1,811 11.76  8.95 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for our linguistic 
complexity measure. Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D present the number of observations and mean values of 
our linguistic complexity measures by country, industry, and year, respectively.  45 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for all conference calls and for calls in English and non-English speaking 
countries 
  
(1)  (2)  (3)    
All firms 
Firms from English 
speaking countries 
Firms from non- 
English speaking 
countries 
P-values 
(2)=(3) 
  
# of firm-
quarters 
Mean 
# of firm-
quarters 
Mean 
# of firm-
quarters 
Mean    
Volume and Volatility                      
AVOL 8,352  0.34  3,938  0.24  4,414  0.43  0.00 
AVAR 8,352  0.49  3,938  0.34  4,414  0.63  0.00 
Linguistic Complexity                
Fog 11,740  11.84  4,802  11.65  6,938  11.98  0.00 
Kincaid 11,740  9.01  4,802  8.82  6,938  9.13  0.00 
Country  characteristics 
Market Cap  11,740  0.05  4,802  0.02  6,938  0.06  0.00 
Market Return  11,740  0.11  4,802  0.11  6,938  0.11  0.80 
Synchronicity 11,740  0.08  4,802  0.04  6,938  0.11  0.00 
Zero Returns  11,740  0.44  4,802  0.56  6,938  0.36  0.00 
Uncertainty Avoidance  11,740  57.42  4,802  45.60  6,938  65.59  0.00 
Firm characteristics 
Size 11,740  14.66  4,802  14.17  6,938  15.00  0.00 
Q  11,740  1.61  4,802 1.61  6,938  1.61 0.94 
Leverage  11,740  0.24  4,802 0.23  6,938  0.26 0.00 
Log_analysts  11,740  1.26  4,802 1.49  6,938  1.10 0.00 
ADR  11,740  0.42  4,802 0.38  6,938  0.44 0.00 
ROA  11,740  0.03  4,802 0.02  6,938  0.04 0.00 
Conference-call characteristics 
Guidance 11,740  0.27  4,802  0.17  6,938  0.33  0.00 
# Previous Calls  11,740  13.00  4,802  16.00  6,938  11.00  0.00 
Translator 11,740  0.00  4,802  0.00  6,938  0.00  0.01 
Words 11,740  3,031  4,802  2,951  6,938  3,085  0.00 
Reluctant 11,740  0.63  4,802  0.61  6,938  0.65  0.00 
Unclear 11,740  0.40  4,802  0.27  6,938  0.50  0.00 
Inaudible 11,740  0.18  4,802  0.11  6,938  0.23  0.00 
Quarter 11,740  0.25  4,802  0.27  6,938  0.24  0.00 
SUE 8,352  0.50  3,938  0.50  4,414  0.51  0.82 
Replag 8352  14.38  3938  14.07  4,414  14.66  0.00 
Dloss 8,352  0.13  3,938  0.15  4,414  0.11  0.00 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics (Continued) 
Panel B: Correlation of linguistic complexity and other variables  
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (15) 
(1)   Fog  1  0.99***  0.00  -0.01  0.06***  -0.08*** 0.05***  -0.04*** 0.04***  -0.08*** 0.01  0.01  0.02**  -0.04*** 0.11***  0.01 
(2)   Kincaid  0.98***  1  -0.01  0.00  0.05***  -0.08*** 0.05***  -0.03*** 0.03***  -0.07*** 0.01  0.02**  0.02**  -0.03*** 0.11***  0.01 
(3)   market cap  -0.05***  -0.06*** 1  -0.06*** 0.14***  -0.13*** 0.1***  0.04***  -0.02**  -0.04*** -0.01  0.08***  0.01  0.02**  -0.01  0.00 
(4)   market return  -0.02**  -0.02  0.00  1  -0.27***  0.03*** 0.1***  0.13*** -0.07***  0.00  0.01  -0.03***  0.04*** 0.05*** -0.03***  0.02* 
(5)   synchronicity  0.08***  0.07*** -0.4*** -0.19***  1  -0.77***  0.22*** 0.01  0.13*** -0.09***  0.03*** 0.08*** 0.00  0.09*** 0.03*** -0.07*** 
(6)   zero returns  -0.09***  -0.08*** 0.35***  0.04***  -0.83*** 1  -0.26*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.14***  -0.04*** -0.1***  0.01  -0.09*** -0.05*** 0.07*** 
(7)   Size  0.07***  0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.23*** -0.27***  1  0.06*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.08*** -0.15***  0.32*** 0.31*** -0.33*** 
(8)   Q  -0.03***  -0.01  0.07*** 0.13*** -0.03***  -0.06***  0.12*** 1  -0.23***  -0.01  0.05*** 0.06*** -0.03***  0.29*** -0.02*  -0.04*** 
(9)   Leverage  0.05***  0.03***  -0.12*** -0.03*** 0.13***  -0.11*** 0.15***  -0.22*** 1  -0.05*  -0.02*** -0.07*  0.02***  -0.15*** 0.05***  0.04*** 
(10) LogAnalysts  -0.07***  -0.06***  0.05*** 0.00  -0.12***  0.11*** 0.13*** 0.01  -0.03***  1  0.05*** -0.01  -0.14***  0.08*** 0.14*** -0.13*** 
(11) adr  0.02*  0.02  -0.12***  0.01  0.03*** -0.05***  0.14*** 0.07*** -0.02*  0.05*** 1  0.07*** -0.03** -0.02** 0.07*** -0.01 
(12) guidance  0.02**  0.03*** 0.02**  -0.03***  0.11*** -0.1*** 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.07***  -0.01  0.07*** 1  -0.01***  0.06*** 0.08*** -0.01*** 
(13) sue  0.00  0.00  -0.03*** 0.06***  0.02**  0.00  -0.25*** -0.16*** 0.02*  -0.32*** -0.04*** 0.00  1  -0.12*** -0.03*** 0.25*** 
(14) roa  -0.05***  -0.04***  0.01  0.00  0.06*** -0.08***  0.19*** 0.54*** -0.2*** 0.07*** -0.02** 0.06*** -0.28***  1  0.06*** -0.43*** 
(15) words  0.12***  0.13*** 0.1***  -0.04***  0.03*** -0.03***  0.32*** -0.01  0.07*** 0.14*** 0.08*** 0.08*** -0.1*** 0.02**  1  -0.08*** 
(16) d_loss  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02**  -0.06*** 0.08***  -0.3***  -0.12*** 0.02  -0.13*** -0.01  -0.01  0.34***  -0.42*** -0.08*** 1 
Notes: Panel A presents descriptive statistics for our sample for English and non-English speaking countries. Panel B reports the Pearson (above the diagonal) and 
Spearman (below the diagonal) correlation coefficients for the variables used in the analysis. Refer to the appendix for a detailed definition of each variable. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Table 4 Determinants of linguistic complexity 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of linguistic complexity on various 
country-, firm-, and conference call level characteristics. Refer to the appendix for a detailed definition of each 
variable. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at 
the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
   Fog   Fog   Kincaid   Kincaid  
EPI *(–1) 0.02***  0.02**
(2.76)  (2.22)   
Language Distance      0.05*  0.04 
  (1.82)  (1.54) 
Country characteristics 
Market Cap  0.00  0.01***  0.00  0.01*** 
  (1.57) (4.42) (1.02) (3.25) 
Market Return  –0.10  –0.12  –0.14**  –0.15** 
(–1.43) (–1.62) (–2.25) (–2.38) 
Synchronicity –0.15  –0.18  –0.13  –0.17 
(–0.75) (–0.95) (–0.71) (–1.13) 
Zero Returns  –0.18  –0.88  –0.39  –1.03 
(–0.14) (–0.67) (–0.31) (–0.80) 
Uncertainty Avoidance  –0.12 –0.35 –0.27 –0.44 
  (–0.36) (–1.03) (–0.83) (–1.38) 
Firm characteristics 
Size –0.08***  –0.06**  –0.06***  –0.04** 
(–3.09) (–2.50) (–2.60) (–2.14) 
Q –0.05*  –0.04  –0.04*  –0.03 
(–1.66) (–1.28) (–1.66) (–1.29) 
Leverage 0.20  0.20  0.13  0.15 
(1.20) (1.29) (0.88) (1.07) 
ROA –0.35  –0.25  –0.26  –0.16 
(–1.35) (–0.95) (–1.08) (–0.67) 
ADR –0.05  –0.09  –0.05  –0.09 
(–0.69) (–1.41) (–0.82) (–1.52) 
Log_analysts –0.04  –0.05  –0.04  –0.04 
(–1.09) (–1.43) (–1.22) (–1.38) 
Conference–call characteristics 
Guidance 0.05  0.04  0.07*  0.06 
  (1.24) (0.98) (1.93) (1.49) 
Words  0.47*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 0.47*** 
(9.90) (10.39) (10.19) (10.73) 
Translation  0.35*** 0.38*** 0.20  0.23** 
(2.79) (3.49) (1.56) (1.99) 
Inaudible  0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 
(0.52) (0.57) (0.32) (0.31) 
Reluctant  –0.33*** –0.33*** –0.31*** –0.30*** 
(–6.44) (–6.30) (–6.45) (–6.28) 
Unclear  –0.19*** –0.19*** –0.17*** –0.17*** 
(–5.28) (–5.17) (–5.19) (–4.94) 
Quarter  –0.08 –0.05 –0.11**  –0.08 
(–1.49) (–0.88) (–2.05) (–1.47) 
# Previous Calls  –0.00 –0.00*  –0.00 –0.00* 
(–1.21) (–1.86) (–1.24) (–1.77) 
      
# of observations  11,084  11,645 11,084 11,645 
R-squared  0.1041 0.0984 0.0911 0.0865 
Fixed Effects   Year & Industry  Year & Industry   Year & Industry  Year & Industry 48 
 
 
Table 5 Capital market consequences of linguistic complexity 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
   AVOL AVOL AVAR AVAR 
Measure of   Fog   Kincaid Fog  Kincaid
Linguistic Complexity  –0.01** –0.01***  –0.02  –0.02* 
(–2.34) (–2.58) (–1.60) (–1.67) 
Country characteristics 
Market Cap  –0.18*  –0.18*  –0.43  –0.43 
(–1.91) (–1.91) (–1.40) (–1.40) 
Market Return  0.12**  0.12**  0.09  0.09 
(2.41) (2.41) (0.63) (0.63) 
Synchronicity  0.17 0.17 0.73 0.73 
(0.64) (0.64) (1.07) (1.07) 
Zero  Returns  –0.02 –0.02 –0.05 –0.05 
(–0.28) (–0.28) (–0.36) (–0.36) 
Firm characteristics 
Size  –0.01 –0.01 –0.00 –0.00 
(–1.14) (–1.13) (–0.26) (–0.25) 
Q 0.00  0.00  –0.02  –0.02 
(0.50) (0.52)  (–1.26)  (–1.24) 
Leverage 0.05  0.05  –0.01  –0.01 
(1.07) (1.06)  (–0.11)  (–0.12) 
ROA  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
  (3.45) (3.49) (4.66) (4.70) 
Log_analysts 0.02**  0.02**  0.10***  0.10*** 
(2.43) (2.43) (4.16) (4.17) 
ADR 0.04***  0.04***  –0.02  –0.02 
(2.74) (2.74)  (–0.72)  (–0.72) 
Conference-call characteristics      
Guidance 0.04***  0.04***  0.06**  0.06** 
  (4.22) (4.23) (2.48) (2.48) 
SUE  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.29) (0.29) 
Translation –0.08  –0.08  0.33*  0.33* 
(0.00) (0.00) (1.70) (1.70) 
Replag 0.00  0.00  0.00*  0.00* 
(0.15) (0.15) (1.76) (1.76) 
Words  0.14*** 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
(8.98) (8.97) (8.08) (7.99) 
Dloss –0.04*  –0.04*  –0.10**  –0.10** 
(–1.70) (–1.70) (–2.51) (–2.50) 
Quarter 0.00  0.00  –0.16***  –0.16*** 
(0.11)  (0.10) (–2.68) (–2.69) 
Inaudible  –0.03 –0.04 –0.05 –0.05 
  (–1.56) (–1.57) (–1.49) (–1.51) 
# of observations  8,352  8,352  8,352  8,352 
R-squared  0.1281 0.1280 0.0847 0.0847 
Fixed Effects  Country, Year &  Country, Year &  Country, Year &  Country, Year & 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of abnormal volatility and abnormal 
variability on our linguistic complexity measures. Refer to the appendix for a detailed definition of each variable. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm 
and year levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 49 
 
 
Table 6 Capital market consequences of linguistic complexity by demand for English 
conference calls 
Panel A: Regression analysis of abnormal volume using Fog as a measure of linguistic complexity 
   Dependent variable: AVOL 
Measure of level of demand: 
Intensity of questions Foreign  ownership Foreign  activities 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Low High Low High  Low  High 
Fog   –0.00  –0.02***  –0.00 –0.02***  –0.01 –0.01* 
(–0.60) (–3.39)  (–0.20)  (–2.92)  (–0.87)  (–1.70) 
Bootstrap test (fog score): 
P-value: 0.04 P -value: 0.05 P -value:  0.21 
 Low barrier= High 
SE Clustering  Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Country characteristics   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Firm & conference call 
characteristics (Table 5)  Included Included Included Included Included  Included 
# of observations  4,192  4,157  4,183  4,169  4,187  4,165 
R-squared  0.1457 0.1315 0.1476 0.1297 0.1180  0.1403 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects  Included Included Included Included Included Included
Panel B: Regression analysis of abnormal volume using Kincaid as a measure of linguistic complexity 
   Dependent variable: AVOL 
Measure of level of demand: 
Intensity of questions Foreign  ownership Foreign  activities 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Low High  Low High  Low  High 
Kincaid –0.00  –0.02***  –0.00 –0.01***  –0.00 –0.01** 
(–0.68) (–3.74) (–0.48) (–2.75)  (–0.70) (–1.98) 
Bootstrap test (fog score): 
 Low barrier= High  P-value:0.05 P-value:  0.10 P-value:0.15 
SE Clustering  Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Country characteristics   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Firm & conference call 
characteristics (Table 5)  Included Included Included Included Included  Included 
# of observations  4,192 4,157 4,183 4,169 4,187  4,165 
R-squared  0.1457 0.1313 0.1476 0.1294 0.1179  0.1403 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects  Included Included Included Included Included Included
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of abnormal volatility on our linguistic 
complexity measures for the partitions based on the Intensity of questions,  Foreign ownership, and Foreign 
activities. Refer to the appendix for a detailed definition of each variable. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. p-values corresponds to 
bootstrap tests for the difference in coefficients for our linguistic complexity measures. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 50 
 
 
Table 7 Change of the effect of linguistic complexity before and after IFRS adoption 
 
Panel A: Regression analysis using Fog as a measure of linguistic complexity  
   Dependent variable: AVOL  Dependent variable: AVAR 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IFRS Adopting 
Countries 
Non-IFRS Adopting 
Countries 
IFRS Adopting 
Countries 
Non-IFRS 
Adopting Countries 
Post IFRS * Fog  0.02**  –0.01**  0.04  0.02 
(2.06) (–2.35)  (1.17)  (0.48) 
Post IFRS  –0.33***  0.09  –0.63  –0.22 
(–3.04) (0.53) (–1.55)  (–0.41) 
Fog –0.02**  –0.01**  –0.04*  –0.03 
  (–2.46) (–2.35)  (–1.76) (–1.33) 
SE Clustering  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year 
Country characteristics   Included Included Included  Included 
Firm & conference call 
characteristics (Table 5) 
Included Included Included  Included 
Observations 4,129  3,670  4,129  3,670 
R-squared 0.1762  0.0585  0.0985  0.0479 
Fixed Effects  Country & Industry  Country & Industry  Country & Industry  Country & Industry 
Panel B: Regression analysis using Kincaid as a measure of linguistic complexity  
   Dependent variable: AVOL  Dependent variable: AVAR 
  
(1)  (2) (3) (4)
IFRS Adopting 
Countries 
Non-IFRS 
Adopting Countries 
IFRS Adopting 
Countries 
Non-IFRS 
Adopting Countries 
Post IFRS * Kincaid  0.02*  –0.01  0.04  0.02 
(1.81) (–0.41)  (1.16)  (0.41) 
Post  IFRS  –0.27***  0.09 –0.54 –0.16 
(–2.88) (0.61)  (–1.60)  (–0.34) 
Kincaid  –0.02**  –0.01* –0.05* –0.02 
  (–2.27) (–1.80) (–1.74) (–0.96) 
SE Clustering  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year 
Country characteristics   Included Included Included Included 
Firm & conference call 
characteristics (Table 5) 
Included Included Included Included 
Observations  4,129 3,670 4,129 3,670 
R-squared  0.1762 0.0581 0.0985 0.0476 
Fixed Effects Country & Industry Country & Industry Country & Industry Country & Industry
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions of abnormal volatility and abnormal 
variability on our linguistic complexity measures post-IFRS adoption. Post IFRS equals one if the country of the 
firm has adopted IFRS in that year and zero otherwise. IFRS adoption dates by country are obtained from Ramanna 
and Sletten (2010). For the non-adopting countries the adoption date is assumed to be fiscal year 2005. Refer to the 
appendix for a detailed definition of each variable. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression 
coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and year levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 51 
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Table 8 Capital market consequences of linguistic complexity for cross-listed securities 
   Dependent variable: AVOL 
Entire Sample  Small Firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Home country 
security 
ADR security 
Home-country 
security 
ADR Security 
Fog   –0.01 0.00  –0.00  –0.02** 
(–0.47)  (0.13) (–0.22) (–2.29) 
SE Clustering  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year 
Country characteristics   Included Included Included Included 
Firm & conference call 
characteristics (Table 5) 
Included Included Included Included 
# of observations  1,321 1,321  667  667 
R-squared  0.1595 0.1130 0.1576 0.1676 
Fixed Effects  Year & Industry  Year & Industry Year  &  Industry Year  &  Industry 
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimate from OLS regressions of abnormal volatility on our linguistic 
complexity measures for cross-listed firms. Models (1) and (3) present the results for the local security and Model 
(2) and (4) present the results for the ADR security. Refer to appendix for detailed definition of each variable. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis below the regression coefficients. We cluster standards errors at the firm and 
year level. p-values corresponds to bootstrap tests for difference in coefficients for our linguistic complexity 
measures. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 53 
 
 
Appendix: Variable definitions 
Category  Variable name  Definition  Empirical measure & data source 
Firm-
characteristics   
Size  Market Value   Log market value of equity measured in U.S. dollars 
Q  Market to Book  Log market value of assets over book value of assets 
Leverage  Leverage  Total debt over book value of assets 
ROA  Return on Assets  Net income over total value of assets 
ADR 
Cross-listed 
Indicator  
Indicator variable that indicates whether or not the firm 
is cross-listed.  
Log_analysts  Log # of Analysts  Log number of analysts  
Foreign activities  % of US Sales  Percentage of US Sales 
Foreign 
ownership 
Foreign 
ownership 
Average percentage of foreign  institutional ownership 
between 2002 and 2007 
Conference 
call 
characteristics 
Fog  Fog  Index  Fog= (words per sentence + percentage of complex 
words) *0.4   
Kincaid  Kincaid Index  Kincaid = (C0 * Words per sentences + C1 * Syllables 
per words) - C3, where the constant terms are (C0= 
0.39, C1= 11.8, and C2= 15.59) 
AVOL  Abnormal 
Volume 
Mean event-period volume divided by the average 
estimation period volume (Landsman et al., 2012) 
AVAR  Abnormal 
Volatility 
Mean of the squared market model adjusted returns 
divided by the variance of the market model residuals 
during the non-event period (Landsman et al., 2012) 
Guidance  Earnings 
guidance 
Indicator variable that takes de value of 1 if the firm 
issued earnings guidance in a 10 days period 
surrounding the conference call or the corresponding 
earnings announcement. 
SUE  Unexpected 
Earnings 
Absolute difference between the actual annual earnings 
per shares minus the most recent mean analyst forecast, 
divided by the actual annual earnings per shares. 
Translated  Translation 
Indicator 
Indicator for conference calls that use a professional 
translator 
Replag    Time from the firm’s fiscal year end to the conference 
call date  
Words  Conference Call  
Number of Words 
Conference call number of words in the Q&A section 
  Reluctant  Reluctant  Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
manager provides answers that show he does not want to 
directly address a question, zero otherwise. 
  Unclear  Unclear  Indicator variable that takes the value of one if analysts 
ask the manager to repeat or clarify, and zero otherwise.  
  Inaudible  Inaudible  Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
conference call transcript contains the word inaudible, 
and zero otherwise.  
  Dloss  Loss indicator  Indicator for firms reporting negative earnings. 
  Quarter  4
th quartercall  Indicator for conference calls corresponding to the 54 
 
indicator  fourth fiscal quarter. 
Appendix: Variable definitions (Continued) 
Category  Variable name  Definition  Empirical measure & data source 
 
# Previous Calls 
Number of 
conference 
calls 
Mean number of previous conference calls made my 
management 
 
Intensity of Question 
Number of 
questions 
Number of questions asked by analysts during the 
conference calls divided by the number of analysts 
attending the conference. 
Country 
characteristics   
Language Distance  Language 
Distance from 
English 
Distance between the English language and the main 
language of each country studied, based on a 5-point 
scale classification system (see Dow and Karunaratna 
2006 for details). 
EPI  English 
Proficiency 
Index 
Measure of a country’s average English proficiency 
(EF Education First). 
  Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Cultural uncertainty avoidance measure of a country 
defined by Geert Hofstede (www.geert-hofstede.com) 
  Market Return  Country 
Market Return 
Index 
Annual change in the Datastream global market index 
  Synchronicity  Synchronicity  National average firm-level measure of synchronicity 
following Morck et al. (2000).  Synchronicity 
=log(R
2/(1-R
2) where R
2 is obtained from the yearly 
market model regression of daily returns.  
  Zero Returns  Percentage of 
Zero Returns 
Yearly country average firm level percentage of daily 
zero returns. 
  Market Cap  Country 
Market 
Capitalization 
Log of equity market capitalization of the country’s 
global Datastream Index.  
 
 
 
 
 